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OPEN DATA HAS  tremendous potential for science, 
but, in human subjects research, there is a tension 
between privacy and releasing high-quality open data. 
Federal law governing student privacy and the release 
of student records suggests that anonymizing student 
data protects student privacy. Guided by this standard, 
we de-identified and released a dataset from 16 massive 
open online courses (MOOCs) from MITx and HarvardX 
on the edX platform. In this article, we show that these 
and other de-identification procedures necessitate 
changes to datasets that threaten replication and 
extension of baseline analyses. In order 
to balance student privacy and the ben-
efits of open data, we suggest focusing 
on protecting privacy without anony-
mizing data by instead expanding poli-
cies that compel researchers to uphold 
the privacy of the subjects in open da-
tasets. If we want to have high-quality 
social science research and also pro-
tect the privacy of human subjects, we 
must eventually have trust in research-
ers. Otherwise, we will always have the 
strict trade-off between anonymity and 
science illustrated here.
The “open” in “massive open on-
line courses” has many interpreta-
tions. Some MOOCs are hosted on 
open-source platforms, some use only 
openly licensed content, and most 
MOOCs are openly accessible to any 
learner without fee or prerequisites. 
We would like to add one more notion 
of openness: open access to data gener-
ated by MOOCs. We argue this is part of 
the responsibility of MOOCs, and that 
fulfilling this responsibility threatens 
current conventions of anonymity in 
policy and public perception.
In this spirit of open data, on May 
30, 2014, as a team of researchers from 
Harvard and MIT that includes this au-
thor team, we announced the release 
of an open dataset containing student 
records from 16 courses conducted in 
the first year of the edX platform. (In 
May 2012, MIT and Harvard launched 
edX, a nonprofit platform for host-
ing and marketing MOOCs. MITx and 
HarvardX are the two respective in-
stitutional organizations focused on 
MOOCs.)6 The dataset is a de-identified 
version of the dataset used to publish 
HarvardX and MITx: The First Year of 
Open Online Courses, a report revealing 
findings about student demographics, 
course-taking patterns, certification 
rates, and other measures of student 
behavior.6 The goal for this data release 
was twofold: first, to allow other re-
searchers to replicate the results of the 
analysis; and second, to allow research-
ers to conduct novel analyses beyond 
the original work, adding to the body of 
literature about open online courses.
Privacy, 
Anonymity, 
and Big Data 
in the Social 
Sciences
DOI:10.1145/2643132
 
 
 Article development led by  
         queue.acm.org
Quality social science research and the privacy 
of human subjects require trust.
BY JON P. DARIES, JUSTIN REICH, JIM WALDO,  
ELISE M. YOUNG, JONATHAN WHITTINGHILL, ANDREW DEAN HO,  
DANIEL THOMAS SEATON, AND ISAAC CHUANG
SEPTEMBER 2014  |   VOL.  57  |   NO.  9  |   COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM     57
P
H
O
T
O
G
R
A
P
H
 B
Y
 F
R
A
N
C
K
 C
A
M
H
I
Within hours of the release, original 
analysis of the data began appearing on 
Twitter, with figures and source code. 
Two weeks after the release, the data 
journalism team at The Chronicle of 
Higher Education published “8 Things 
You Should Know about MOOCs,” an 
article that explored new dimensions 
of the dataset, including the gender 
balance of the courses.13 Within the 
first month of the release, the data 
had been downloaded more than 650 
times. With surprising speed, the data-
set began fulfilling its purpose: to allow 
the research community to use open 
data from online learning platforms to 
advance scientific progress.
The rapid spread of new research 
from this data is exciting, but this ex-
citement is tempered by a necessary 
limitation of the released data: they 
represent a subset of the complete 
data. In order to comply with federal 
regulations on student privacy, the 
released dataset had to be de-identi-
fied. In this article, we demonstrate 
trade-offs between our need to meet 
the demands of federal regulations of 
student privacy, on the one hand, and 
our responsibility to release data for 
replication and downstream analyses, 
on the other. For example, the original 
analysis found approximately 5% of 
course registrants earned certificates. 
Some methods of de-identification cut 
that percentage in half.
It is impossible to anonymize iden-
tifiable data without the possibility of 
affecting some future analysis in some 
way. It is possible to quantify the dif-
ference between replications from the 
de-identified data and original find-
ings; however, it is difficult to fully an-
ticipate whether findings from novel 
analyses will result in valid insights or 
artifacts of de-identification. Higher 
standards for de-identification can 
lead to lower-value de-identified data. 
This could have a chilling effect on the 
motivations of social science research-
ers. If findings are likely to be biased 
by the de-identification process, why 
should researchers spend their scarce 
time on de-identified data?
At the launch of edX in May of 2012, 
the presidents of MIT and Harvard 
spoke about the edX platform, and 
the data generated by it, as a public 
good. If academic and independent 
researchers alike have access to data 
from MOOCs, the progress of research 
into online education will be faster and 
results can be furthered, refined, and 
tested. However, these ideals for open 
MOOC data are undermined if protect-
ing student privacy means that open 
datasets are markedly different from 
the original data. The tension between 
privacy and open data is in need of a 
better solution than anonymized data-
sets. Indeed, the fundamental problem 
in our current regulatory framework 
may be an unfortunate and unneces-
sary conflation of privacy and anonym-
ity. Skopek17 outlines the difference be-
tween the two as follows:
…under the condition of privacy, we 
have knowledge of a person’s identity, 
but not of an associated personal fact, 
whereas under the condition of anonym-
ity, we have knowledge of a personal fact, 
but not of the associated person’s iden-
tity. In this sense, privacy and anonymity 
are flip sides of each other. And for this 
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…other information that, alone or in 
combination, is linked or linkable to a 
specific student that would allow a rea-
sonable person in the school community, 
who does not have personal knowledge of 
the relevant circumstances, to identify the 
student with reasonable certainty. 
In assessing the reasonable cer-
tainty of identification, the education-
al institution is supposed to take into 
account other data releases that might 
increase the chance of identification.22 
Therefore, an adequate de-identifica-
tion procedure must not only remove 
statutorily required elements, but also 
quasi-identifiers. These quasi-identifi-
ers are pieces of information that can 
be uniquely identifying in combina-
tion with each other or with additional 
data sources from outside the student 
records. They are not defined by stat-
ute or regulatory guidance from the 
Department of Education but left up to 
the educational institution to define.22
The potential for combining quasi-
identifiers to uniquely identify individ-
uals is well established. For example, 
Sweeney21 has demonstrated that 87% 
of the U.S. population can be uniquely 
identified with a reasonable degree of 
certainty by a combination of ZIP code, 
date of birth, and gender. These risks 
are further heightened in open, online 
learning environments because of the 
public nature of the activity. As another 
example, some MOOC students par-
ticipate in course discussion forums—
which, for many courses, remain avail-
able online beyond the course end date. 
Students’ usernames are displayed be-
side their posts, allowing for linkages 
of information across courses, poten-
tially revealing students who enroll for 
unique combinations of courses. A very 
common use of the discussion forums 
early in a course is a self-introduction 
thread where students state their age 
and location among other PII. Mean-
while, another source of identifying 
data is social media. It is conceivable 
that students could verbosely log their 
online education on Facebook or Twit-
ter, tweeting as soon as they register 
for a new course or mentioning their 
course grade in a Facebook post. Given 
these external sources, an argument 
can be made that many columns in the 
dataset person-course that would not 
typically be thought of as identifiers 
could qualify as quasi-identifiers. 
reason, they can often function in oppo-
site ways: whereas privacy often hides 
facts about someone whose identity is 
known by removing information and oth-
er goods associated with the person from 
public circulation, anonymity often hides 
the identity of someone about whom facts 
are known for the purpose of putting such 
goods into public circulation.
Realizing the potential of open data 
in social science requires a new para-
digm for the protection of student priva-
cy: either a technological solution such 
as differential privacy,3 which separates 
analysis from possession of the data, or 
a policy-based solution that allows open 
access to possibly re-identifiable data 
while policing the uses of the data.
This article describes the motiva-
tions behind efforts to release learner 
data, the contemporary regulatory 
framework of student privacy, our 
efforts to comply with those regula-
tions in creating an open dataset from 
MOOCs, and some analytical conse-
quences of de-identification. From this 
case study in de-identification, we con-
clude that the scientific ideals of open 
data and the current regulatory re-
quirements concerning anonymizing 
data are incompatible. Resolving that 
incompatibility will require new ap-
proaches that better balance the pro-
tection of privacy and the advancement 
of science in educational research and 
the social sciences more broadly.
Balancing Open Data and 
Student Privacy Regulations
As with open source code and openly li-
censed content, support for open data 
has been steadily building. In the U.S., 
government agencies have increased 
their expectations for sharing research 
data.5 In 2003, the National Institutes 
of Health became the first federal 
agency to require research grant appli-
cants to describe their plans for data 
sharing.12 In 2013, the Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy released 
a memorandum requiring the public 
storage of digital data from unclassi-
fied, federally funded research.7 These 
trends dovetailed with growing inter-
est in data sharing in the learning sci-
ences community. In 2006, research-
ers from Carnegie Mellon University 
opened DataShop, a repository of event 
logs from intelligent tutoring systems 
and one of the largest sources of open 
data in educational research outside 
the federal government.8 
Open data has tremendous poten-
tial across the scientific disciplines to 
facilitate greater transparency through 
replication and faster innovation 
through novel analyses. It is particular-
ly important in research into open, on-
line learning such as MOOCs. A study 
released earlier this year1 estimates 
there are over seven million people in 
the U.S. alone who have taken at least 
one online course, and that that num-
ber is growing by 6% each year. These 
students are taking online courses at 
a variety of institutions, from commu-
nity colleges to research universities, 
and open MOOC data will facilitate 
research that could be helpful to all in-
stitutions with online offerings. 
Open data can also facilitate coop-
eration between researchers with dif-
ferent domains of expertise. As George 
Siemens, the president of the Society 
for Learning Analytics Research, has 
argued, learning research involving 
large and complex datasets requires 
interdisciplinary collaboration be-
tween data scientists and educational 
researchers.16 Open data sets make it 
easier for researchers in these two dis-
tinct domains to come together.
While open educational data has 
great promise for advancing science, it 
also raises important questions about 
student privacy. In higher education, 
the cornerstone of student privacy law is 
the Family Educational Rights and Pri-
vacy Act (FERPA)—a federal privacy stat-
ute that regulates access to and disclo-
sure of a student’s educational records. 
In our de-identification procedures, we 
aimed to comply with FERPA, although 
not all institutions consider MOOC 
learners to be subject to FERPA.11 
FERPA offers protections for per-
sonally identifiable information (PII) 
within student records. Per FERPA, 
PII cannot be disclosed, but if PII is 
removed from a record, then the stu-
dent becomes anonymous, privacy is 
protected, and the resulting de-identi-
fied data can be disclosed to anyone. 
FERPA thus equates anonymity—the 
removal of PII—with privacy.
FERPA’s PII definition includes 
some statutorily defined categories, 
such as name, address, Social Security 
Number, and mother’s maiden name, 
but also: 
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As with open source 
code and openly 
licensed content, 
support for open 
data has been 
steadily building. 
The regulatory framework defined 
by FERPA guided our efforts to de-iden-
tify the person-course dataset for an 
open release. Removing direct identi-
fiers such as students’ usernames and 
IP addresses was straightforward, but 
the challenge of dealing with quasi-
identifiers was more complicated. We 
opted for a framework of k-anonym-
ity.20 A dataset is k-anonymous if any 
one individual in the dataset cannot be 
distinguished from at least k–1 other 
individuals in the same dataset. This 
requires ensuring that no individual 
has a combination of quasi-identifiers 
different from k–1 others. If a dataset 
cannot meet these requirements, then 
the data must be modified to meet k-
anonymity, either by generalizing data 
within cases or suppressing entire 
cases. For example, if a single student 
in the dataset is from Latvia, two rem-
edies exist: we can generalize her loca-
tion by reporting her as from “Europe” 
rather than Latvia; we can suppress her 
location information; or we can sup-
press her case entirely. 
This begins to illustrate the funda-
mental tension between generating 
datasets that meet the requirements 
of anonymity mandates and advanc-
ing the science of learning through 
public releases of data. Protecting stu-
dent privacy under the current regula-
tory regime requires modifying data to 
ensure individual students cannot be 
identified. These modifications can, 
however, change the dataset consider-
ably, raising serious questions about 
the utility of the open data for repli-
cation or novel analysis. Here, we de-
scribe our approach to generating a k-
anonymous dataset, and then examine 
the consequences of our modifications 
to the size and nature of the dataset. 
De-Identification Methods
The dataset we wished to release was 
a “person-course” dataset, meaning 
each row represents one course regis-
tration for one person (a person with 
three course registrations will have 
three rows in the dataset). The original 
dataset contained: 
 ˲ information about students (user-
name, IP address, country, self-report-
ed level of education, self-reported year 
of birth, and self-reported gender); 
 ˲ the course ID (a string identifying 
the institution, semester, and course); 
 ˲ information about student activ-
ity in the course (date and time of first 
interaction, date and time of last inter-
action, number of days active, number 
of chapters viewed, number of events 
recorded by the edX platform, number 
of video play events, number of forum 
posts, and final course grade); and 
 ˲ four variables we computed to 
indicate level of course involvement 
(registered: enrolled in the course; 
viewed: interacted with the courseware 
at least once; explored: interacted with 
content from more than 50% of course 
chapters; and certified: earned a pass-
ing grade and received a certificate).
Transforming this person-course 
dataset into a k-anonymous dataset 
we believed met FERPA guidelines re-
quired four steps: defining identifiers 
and quasi-identifiers, defining the 
value for k, removing identifiers, and 
modifying or deleting values of quasi-
identifiers from the dataset in a way 
that ensures k-anonymity while mini-
mizing changes to the dataset.
We defined two variables in the 
original dataset as identifiers and six 
variables as quasi-identifiers. The 
username was considered identifying 
in and of itself, so we replaced it with 
a random ID. IP address was also re-
moved. Four student demographic 
variables were defined as quasi-identi-
fiers: country, gender, age, and level of 
education. Course ID was considered a 
quasi-identifier since students might 
take unique combinations of courses 
and because it provides a link between 
PII posted in forums and the person-
course dataset. The number of forum 
posts made by a student was also a 
quasi-identifier because a determined 
individual could scrape the content of 
the forums from the archived courses 
and then identify users with unique 
numbers of forum posts.
Once the quasi-identifiers were 
chosen, we had to determine a value 
of k to use for implementing k-ano-
nymity. In general, larger values of k 
require greater changes to de-identify, 
and smaller values of k leave datasets 
more vulnerable to re-identification. 
The U.S. Department of Education of-
fers guidance to the de-identification 
process in a variety of contexts, but it 
does not recommend or require spe-
cific values of k for specific contexts. 
In one FAQ, the Department’s Privacy 
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The key part of  
the de-identification 
process was 
modifying  
the data such  
that no combination 
of quasi-identifiers 
described groups  
of students  
smaller than five. 
lem of de-identification, but these were 
two that were easily implemented. Our 
intent is not to discern the dominance 
of one technique over the other in any 
general case but rather to show that 
trade-offs between anonymity and val-
id research inferences a) are unavoid-
able and b) will depend on the method 
of de-identification. 
The Suppression Emphasis (SE) 
method used generalization for the 
names of countries (grouping them 
into continent/region names for coun-
tries with fewer than 5,000 rows) and 
for the first event and last event time 
stamps (grouping them into dates by 
truncating the hour and minute por-
tion of the time stamps). Suppres-
sion was then employed for rows that 
were not k-anonymous across the 
quasi-identifying variables. For more 
information on the specifics of the 
implementation, please refer to the 
documentation accompanying the 
data release.10 
The Generalization Emphasis (GE) 
method generalized year of birth into 
groups of two (for example, 1980–
1981), and number of forum posts into 
groups of five for values greater than 10 
(for example, 11–15). Suppression was 
then employed for rows that were not 
k-anonymous across the quasi-iden-
tifying variables. The generalizations 
resulted in a dataset that needed less 
suppression than in the SE method, 
but also reduced the precision of the 
generalized variables. 
Both de-identification processes are 
more likely to suppress registrants in 
smaller courses: the smaller a course, 
the higher the chances that any given 
combination of demographics would 
not be k-anonymous, and the more 
likely this row would need to be sup-
pressed. Furthermore, since an activity 
variable (number of forum posts) was 
included as a quasi-identifier, both 
methods were likely to remove users 
who were more active in the forums. 
Since only 8% of students had any posts 
in the forums at all, and since these 
students were typically active in other 
ways, the records of many of the most 
active students were suppressed. 
The Consequences of Two 
Approaches to De-Identification
Both of the de-identified datasets dif-
fer from the original dataset in sub-
Technical Assistance Center states 
that many “statisticians consider a cell 
size of 3 to be the absolute minimum” 
and goes on to say that values of 5 to 10 
are even safer.15 We chose a k of five for 
our de-identification. 
Since our dataset contained regis-
trations for 16 courses, registrations 
in multiple courses could be used for 
re-identification. The k-anonymity ap-
proach would ensure no individual 
was uniquely identifiable using the 
quasi-identifiers within a course, but 
further care had to be taken in order to 
remove the possibility that a registrant 
could be uniquely identified based 
upon registering in a unique combi-
nation or number of courses. For ex-
ample, if only three people registered 
for all 16 courses, then those three 
registrants would not be k-anonymous 
across courses, and some of their reg-
istration records would need to be sup-
pressed in order to lower the risk of 
their re-identification.
The key part of the de-identification 
process was modifying the data such 
that no combination of quasi-identifi-
ers described groups of students small-
er than five. The two tools employed 
for this task were generalization and 
suppression. Generalization is the com-
bining of more granular values into 
categories (for example, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 
5 become “1–5”), and suppression is the 
deletion of data that compromises k-an-
onymity.21 Many strategies for de-iden-
tification, including Sweeney’s Datafly 
algorithm, implement both tools with 
different amounts of emphasis on one 
technique or the other.18 More general-
ization would mean fewer records are 
suppressed, but the remaining records 
would be less specific than the original 
data. A heavier reliance on suppression 
would remove more records from the 
data, but the remaining records would 
be less altered. 
Here, we illustrate differential 
trade-offs between valid research infer-
ences and de-identification methods 
by comparing two de-identification 
approaches: one that favors general-
ization over suppression (hereafter 
referred to as the Generalization Em-
phasis, or GE, method), and one that 
favors suppression over generalization 
(hereafter referred to as the Suppres-
sion Emphasis, or SE, method). There 
are other ways to approach the prob-
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stantial ways. We reproduced analyses 
conducted on the original dataset and 
evaluated the magnitude of changes in 
the new datasets. Those differences are 
highlighted here. 
Both de-identified datasets are sub-
stantially smaller than the original 
dataset (see Table 1), but de-identifi-
cation did not affect enrollment num-
bers uniformly across courses. Table 
1 shows the percentage decrease of 
enrollment in each de-identified data-
set compared to the original file. Only 
a small percentage of records from 
CS50x were removed because CS50x 
was hosted off the edX platform, and 
so we have no data about forum usage 
(one of our quasi-identifying variables). 
Table 2 shows that de-identification 
has a disproportionate impact on the 
most active students. Ho et al.6 identi-
fied four mutually exclusive categories 
of students: Only Registered enrolled 
in the course but did not interact with 
the courseware; Only Viewed inter-
acted with at least one, and fewer than 
half, of the course chapters; Only Ex-
plored interacted with content from 
half or more of the course chapters but 
did not earn a certificate; and Certi-
fied earned a certificate in the course. 
In Table 2, we see that the proportions 
of students in each category seem to 
change only slightly after de-identi-
fication; however, the percentage of 
certified students in the de-identified 
dataset is nearly half the percentage in 
the original dataset. Given the policy 
concerns around MOOC certification 
rates, this is a substantially important 
difference, even if only a small change 
in percentage points. 
Demographic data from the de-
identified datasets was similar to the 
original person-course dataset. Table 3 
shows the distributions of gender and 
bachelor’s degree attainment, respec-
tively, for each dataset. The propor-
tions of bachelor’s degree holders in all 
three datasets are nearly identical. The 
de-identified datasets report slightly 
lower percentages of female students 
than the original dataset. The gender 
bias of MOOCs is a sensitive policy is-
sue, so this difference raises concerns 
about analyses conducted with the de-
identified datasets. 
The suppression of highly active us-
ers substantially reduces the median 
number of total events in the course-
ware. Table 3 shows the median events 
for all three datasets, and the de-identi-
fied datasets have median event values 
that are two-thirds of the value report-
ed by the original dataset. 
Finally, we analyzed the correla-
tions among variables in all three of 
the datasets. We use correlations to 
illustrate possible changes in predic-
tive models that rely on correlation 
and covariance matrices, from the 
regression-based prediction of grades 
to principal components analyses and 
other multivariate methods. Although 
straight changes in correlations are 
dependent on base rates, and averages 
of correlations are not well formed, we 
present these simple statistics here for 
ease of interpretation. No correlation 
changed direction, and all remain sig-
Table 1. Percent decrease in records by course and by de-identification method.
Institution Course Code Baseline N
GE  
Reduction
SE  
Reduction
Average  
Reduction
HarvardX CS50x 181,410 4% 6% 5%
MITx 6.002x 51,394 15% 21% 18%
MITx 6.00x 72,920 15% 21% 18%
MITx 6.00x 84,511 16% 21% 18%
MITx 6.002x 29,050 17% 23% 20%
MITx 8.02x 41,037 17% 24% 21%
HarvardX PH278x 53,335 18% 26% 22%
HarvardX ER22x 79,750 21% 28% 25%
MITx 14.73x 39,759 22% 30% 26%
HarvardX CB22x 43,555 23% 31% 27%
HarvardX PH207x 61,170 25% 32% 28%
MITx 3.091x 24,493 33% 42% 37%
MITx 8.MReV 16,787 33% 44% 38%
MITx 7.00x 37,997 35% 45% 40%
MITx 3.091x 12,276 39% 50% 44%
MITx 2.01x 12,243 44% 54% 49%
Total 841,687 18% 24% 21%
Table 2. Percent decrease in records by activity category and by de-identification method.
Activity  
Category Baseline N
Baseline  
Percentage
GE  
Percentage
SE  
Percentage
GE  
Change
SE  
Change
Only Registered 292,852 34.8% 37.3% 37.6% +2.5% +2.8%
Only Viewed 469,702 55.8% 56.2% 56.1% +0.4% +0.3%
Only Explored 35,937 4.3% 3.6% 3.5% –0.7% –0.7%
Certified 43,196 5.1% 2.9% 2.8% –2.2% –2.4%
Total 841,687 100% 100% 100%
MITx 8.02x 41,037 17% 24% 24% 21%
Total 841,687 18% 24% 24% 21%
Table 3. Changes in demographics and activity by de-identification method.
Statistic Baseline GE SE
GE % 
Change
SE % 
Change
Percent Bachelor's or Higher 63% 63% 63% 0.1% –0.2%
Percent Female 29% 26% 26% –2.2% –2.9%
Median Number of Events (ex-
plored + certified)
3645 2194 2052 –40% –44%
MITx 8.02x 41,037 17% 24% 21%
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other analyses will not have been cor-
rupted by de-identification.
At this point it may be possible to 
take for granted that any standard for 
de-identification will increase over 
time. Information is becoming more 
accessible, and researchers are in-
creasingly sophisticated and creative 
about possible re-identification strate-
gies. Cynthia Dwork, in a presentation 
on “big data and privacy” sponsored 
by MIT and the White House in early 
2014, pointed out that de-identifica-
tion efforts have been progressing as a 
sort of arms race, similar to advances 
in the field of cryptography.4 Although 
k-anonymity is a useful heuristic, re-
searchers have challenged that it alone 
is not sufficient. Machanavajjhala et 
al.9 point out that a k-anonymous data-
set is still vulnerable to a “homogeneity 
attack.” If, after undergoing a process 
that ensures k-anonymity, there exists 
a group of size k or larger for whom the 
value of a sensitive variable is homoge-
nous (that is, all members of the group 
have the same value), then the value 
of that sensitive variable is effectively 
disclosed even if the attacker does not 
nificant at the 0.05 level. For all regis-
trants, the SE dataset reported correla-
tions marginally closer to the original 
dataset than the GE method, while for 
explored and certified students only, 
the GE dataset was slightly closer to 
the original (see Table 4).
It is possible to use the results from 
the previous tables to formulate a mul-
tivariate model that has population pa-
rameters in these tables. By generating 
data from such a model in proportion 
to the numbers we have in the baseline 
dataset, we would enable researchers 
to replicate the correlations and mean 
values above. However, such a model 
would lead to distorted results for any 
analysis that is not implied by the multi-
variate model we select. In addition, the 
unusual distributions we see in MOOC 
data2 would be difficult to model using 
conventional distributional forms.
The comparisons presented here 
between the de-identified datasets and 
the original dataset provide evidence 
for the tension between protecting an-
onymity and releasing useful data. We 
emphasize the differences identified 
here are not those that may be most 
concerning. These analyses charac-
terize the difference that researchers 
conducting replication studies might 
expect to see. For novel analyses that 
have yet to be performed on the data, 
it is difficult to formulate an a priori 
estimate of the impact of de-identifica-
tion. For researchers hoping to use de-
identified, public datasets to advance 
research, this means that any given 
finding might be the result of perturba-
tions from de-identification.
Better Options for Science and 
Privacy with Respect to MOOC Data
As illustrated in the previous section, 
the differences between the de-identi-
fied dataset and the original data range 
from small changes in the proportion 
of various demographic categories to 
large decreases in activity variables 
and certification rates. It is quite pos-
sible that analyses not yet thought of 
would yield even more dramatic differ-
ences between the two datasets. Even 
if a de-identification method is found 
that maintains many of the observed 
research results from the original da-
taset, there can be no guarantee that 
Table 4. Changes in Pearson Correlations by de-identification method and activity category.
Variable 1 Variable 2 Registrants
Baseline  
Correlation
GE  
Correlation
SE  
Correlation
GE  
Change (+/–)
SE  
Change (+/–)
Grade Number of days active All 0.800 0.750 0.745 –0.050 –0.055
Grade Number of days active Explored + Certified 0.553 0.558 0.564 +0.005 +0.011
Grade Number of events All 0.722 0.701 0.697 –0.021 –0.025
Grade Number of events Explored + Certified 0.458 0.495 0.501 +0.037 +0.043
Grade Number of forum posts All 0.146 0.064 0.156 –0.082 +0.010
Grade Number of forum posts Explored + Certified 0.074 0.036 0.108 –0.038 +0.034
Grade Number of video plays All 0.396 0.397 0.403 +0.001 +0.007
Grade Number of video plays Explored + Certified 0.159 0.194 0.189 +0.035 +0.030
Number of events Number of days active All 0.844 0.837 0.835 –0.007 –0.009
Number of events Number of days active Explored + Certified 0.736 0.773 0.776 +0.037 +0.040
Number of events Number of video plays All 0.665 0.698 0.714 +0.033 +0.049
Number of events Number of video plays Explored + Certified 0.587 0.628 0.634 +0.041 +0.047
Number of forum posts Number of days active All 0.207 0.104 0.207 –0.103 +0.000
Number of forum posts Number of days active Explored + Certified 0.180 0.103 0.200 –0.077 +0.020
Number of forum posts Number of events All 0.287 0.117 0.194 –0.170 –0.093
Number of forum posts Number of events Explored + Certified 0.279 0.113 0.176 –0.166 –0.103
Number of forum posts Number of video plays All 0.091 0.035 0.100 –0.056 +0.009
Number of forum posts Number of video plays Explored + Certified 0.051 0.014 0.050 –0.037 –0.001
Number of video plays Number of days active All 0.474 0.492 0.505 +0.018 +0.031
Number of video plays Number of days active Explored + Certified 0.311 0.404 0.407 +0.093 +0.096
Average All 0.463 0.420 0.456 –0.044 –0.008
Average Explored + Certified 0.339 0.332 0.361 –0.007 +0.022
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know exactly which record belongs to 
the target. Machanavajjhala et al. de-
fine this principle as l-diversity. Other 
researchers have advanced an alphabet 
soup of critiques to k-anonymity such 
as m-invariance and t-similarity.4 Even 
if it were possible to devise a de-iden-
tification method that did not impact 
statistical analysis, it could quickly 
become outmoded by advances in re-
identification techniques.
This example of our efforts to de-
identify a simple set of student data—a 
tiny fraction of the granular event logs 
available from the edX platform—re-
veals a conflict between open data, the 
replicability of results, and the poten-
tial for novel analyses on one hand, 
and the anonymity of research subjects 
on the other. This tension extends be-
yond MOOC data to much of social sci-
ence data, but the challenge is acute in 
educational research because FERPA 
conflates anonymity—and therefore 
de-identification—with privacy. One 
conclusion could be this data is too 
sensitive to share; so if de-identifica-
tion has too large an impact on the 
integrity of a dataset, then the data 
should not be shared. We believe this 
is an undesirable position, because 
the few researchers privileged enough 
to have access to the data would then 
be working in a bubble where few of 
their peers have the ability to challenge 
or augment their findings. Such limits 
would, at best, slow down the advance-
ment of knowledge. At worst, these 
limits would prevent groundbreaking 
research from ever being conducted.
Neither abandoning open data nor 
loosening student privacy protections 
are wise options. Rather, the research 
community should vigorously pursue 
technology and policy solutions to the 
tension between open data and privacy. 
A promising technological solu-
tion is differential privacy.3 Under the 
framework of differential privacy, the 
original data is maintained, but raw 
PII is not accessed by the researcher. 
Instead, they reside in a secure da-
tabase that has the ability to answer 
questions about the data. A research-
er can submit a model—a regression 
equation, for example—to the data-
base, and the regression coefficients 
and R-squared are returned. Differen-
tial privacy has challenges of its own, 
and remains an open research ques-
tion because implementing such a sys-
tem would require carefully crafting 
limits around the number and speci-
ficity of questions that can be asked in 
order to prevent identification of sub-
jects. For example, no answer could be 
returned if it drew upon fewer than k 
rows, where k is the same minimum 
cell size used in k-anonymity. 
Policy changes may be more feasi-
ble in the short term. An approach sug-
gested by the U.S. President’s Council 
of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(PCAST) is to accept that anonymiza-
tion is an obsolete tactic made increas-
ingly difficult by advances in data min-
ing and big data.14 PCAST recommends 
that privacy policy emphasize the use of 
data should not compromise privacy, 
and should focus “on the ‘what’ rather 
than the ‘how.’”14 One can imagine a 
system whereby researchers accessing 
an open dataset would agree to use the 
data only to pursue particular ends, 
such as research, and not to contact 
subjects for commercial purposes or to 
rerelease the data. Such a policy would 
need to be accompanied by provisions 
for enforcement and audits, and the 
creation of practicable systems for en-
forcement is, admittedly, no small feat. 
We propose that privacy can be up-
held by researchers bound to an ethical 
and legal framework, even if these re-
searchers can identify individuals and 
all of their actions. If we want to have 
high-quality social science research 
and privacy of human subjects, we must 
eventually have trust in researchers. Oth-
erwise, we will always have a strict trade-
off between anonymity and science.  
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